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ABSTRACT:  Medicare Advantage plans are now paid $11 billion a year, and $150 billion over 
10 years, more than costs in regular fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare.  In the past two years there 
have been discussions about reducing MA payments to the level of 100 percent of average 
costs in FFS and using the savings to offset the costs of new Federal health initiatives such as 
health care reform.  Earlier this year, OMB proposed “reducing Medicare overpayments to pri-
vate insurers through competitive payments.”  Under this proposal, MA plan “payments would 
be based on an average of plans’ bids submitted to Medicare.”   This issue brief analyzes the 
new proposal using data on MA plan benchmarks, bids and rebates, and enrollment for 2009. 
 Analysis of MA plan bids indicates that, while the national average of MA plan bids in the 
3,140 counties in the US is 101 percent of FFS costs, the actual level of bids by plans in indi-
vidual counties varies greatly.  Under a bid-based MA payment system, plans would receive 
under payments - payments less than 100 percent of FFS – of $3.2 billion in approximately 
800 counties.  These under payments would be balanced with continued extra payments – 
payments greater than 100 percent of FFS - of $3.8 billion to plans in approximately 2,300 
counties. 
 Bid-based payments in eight states would average less than 100 percent FFS while in the 
other 42, the average would be greater than FFS costs.  Most notably, bid-based payments in 
Florida would average 21 percent less than FFS costs, $2,200 per enrollee per year and a total 
of almost $2 billion a year.   Bid-based payments in 11 states would continue to average more 
than $1,000 per enrollee per year over fee-for-service costs.  Extra payments in both Oregon 
and Washington State would average 18 percent more than FFS costs and total $320 million a 
year in Oregon and $290 million in Washington.   
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As a Presidential candidate, Barack Obama consistently indicated that he supported paying 
Medicare private plans the same amount as fee-for-service Medicare.  In the fall of 2008, for 
example, the Obama campaign stated in a summary of its health care policy: “We need to 
eliminate the excessive subsidies to Medicare Advantage plans and pay them the same amount 
it would cost to treat the same patients under regular Medicare.”1   This policy position was 
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generally understood to mean that an Obama 
Administration would propose to eliminate extra 
payments to Medicare Advantage private plans that 
average approximately 13% or $1,000 per enrollee 
per year in 2009.2  
 In December 2008, the Congressional Budget 
Office in Budget Options Volume 1: Health Care 
published the projected savings and costs of 115 
options to reform Federal health care policy.  In 
Option 63 in this volume, CBO projected that a 
policy that would “Set the Benchmark for Pri-
vate Plans in Medicare Equal to Local Per Capita 
Fee-for-Service Spending” would reduce Medicare 
spending by $157 billion from 2010 to 2019.3  
 In late February of this year, the Obama ad-
ministration’s Office of Management and Budget 
issued a report A New Era of Responsibility that, 
among a wide range of Federal policy changes, 
described a number of polices for financing health 
care reform.  One of the polices included was “Re-
ducing Medicare Overpayments to Private Insur-
ers Through Competitive Payments.”  This policy 
would “replace the current mechanism to establish 
payments (to MA plans) with a competitive system 
in which payments would be based upon an aver-
age of plans’ bids submitted to Medicare Advan-
tage.  This would allow the market, not Medicare, 
to set the reimbursement limits, and save taxpayers 
more than $175 billion over 10 years, as well as 
reduce Part B premiums.”4  
 Though the specific details of this OMB 
proposal are not described in A New Era of Respon-
sibility, the CBO Budget Options Volume 1: Health 
Care, describes a model for MA competitive bid-
ding in Option 65 “Establishing Benchmarks for 
the Medicare Advantage Program Through Com-
petitive Bidding”.5, 6 
 Under the Medicare Advantage competitive 
bidding payment system described by CBO “the 
benchmark for each county would be the average 
bid of the plans that served the county, with each 
plan’s bid weighted by its enrollment the previous 
year.  However, benchmarks would be constrained 
so they did not exceed the benchmarks that would 
have existed under current law.”7 
 CBO explains that the argument for a com-
petitive bidding based payment system is “that 
it would reduce the per capita amount paid for 
benefits for enrollees in Medicare Advantage plans 
to levels determined by the plans’ bids.  The option 
might also encourage private plans to compete 
more strongly on the basis of price.”8  CBO esti-
mates that the described competitive bidding based 
system would reduce Medicare spending by $158 
billion over 10 years. 
 The analysis in this paper will examine the 
impact on payments to MA plans using the data on 
the level of MA plan bids and rebates reported by 
the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission to-
gether with data on Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) 
costs in 2009 and on MA enrollment in February 
2009 reported by the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS). 
 Generally, this analysis finds that in most 
counties a competitive bid-based payment system 
would not pay plans the same as 100 percent of 
fee-for-service (FFS) costs in the county.  While the 
national average of payments to plans would be 
101 percent of FFS, plans in most counties would 
be paid significantly more or less that 100 of FFS 
costs.   
 Under a bid-based MA payment system, plans 
would receive under payments — payments less 
than 100 percent of FFS – of $3.2 billion in ap-
proximately 800 of the 3,140 counties in the US.  
These under payments would be balanced with 
continued extra payments – payments greater than 
100 percent of FFS – of $3.8 billion to plans in ap-
proximately 2,300 counties. 
 In eight states, plans would, on average, be 
paid less than FFS costs, while in the other 42 states 
plans would continue to be paid more than FFS 
costs.  
 At the state level, payments to plans would 
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average $2,200 per MA enrollee less than FFS costs 
in Florida and $1,300 less in Nevada.  In 11 states – 
Oregon, Washington, Virginia, New Mexico, Rhode 
Island, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Vermont, Wisconsin 
and Alaska – extra payments would continue to 
average more than $1,000 per enrollee per year.
EXPERIENCE WITH MEDICARE COMPETITIVE 
BIDDING BASED PAYMENTS TO PRIVATE PLANS 
The proposal to establish a competitive bidding 
based payment system for Medicare private plans is 
not new.9   
 In 1996, the Health Care Financing Adminis-
tration10 developed a Medicare plan competitive 
bidding demonstration program under its general 
demonstration authority, and Baltimore, MD was 
chosen as the first site for the demonstration.11  
However, health plans in the area opposed the 
proposed program, citing issues including: their 
inability to calculate an accurate bid since the bid 
would be only a share of the local payment bench-
mark; the incentive for plans to reduce their bid by 
increasing enrollee out-of-pocket costs; and, the use 
of third-party contractors to provide beneficiaries 
with plan information.  Under this pressure, the 
plan was abandoned. 
 In 1997, a similar demonstration was proposed 
in Denver, CO.  However, like its predecessor, the 
plan was killed before being implemented; this time 
through legal action. 
 Later in 1997, the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) 
provided explicit authority to the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) to establish 
competitive bidding demonstrations, which would 
be designed by a national Competitive Pricing Au-
thority Committee (CPAC).  The two sites chosen 
for this demonstration were Kansas City and Phoe-
nix.  Despite new elements to the proposed system, 
including setting the government payment rate at 
the enrollment-weighted average of plan bids, op-
position grew quickly in Arizonia and soon arose in 
Kansas City.  In November 1999, the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act of 2000 included a provision 
proposed by Senator Kyl of Arizona that prohibited 
further spending on the demonstrations in fiscal 
year 2000. 
 Following the experience with the Medicare 
private plan demonstrations, authority for a dem-
onstration of a broader premium support approach 
in both traditional fee-for-service Medicare and 
Medicare Advantage was included in the Medicare 
Modernization Act in 2003.  This authority re-
quired the federal government to conduct a six-year 
“comparative cost adjustment program” demon-
stration in up to six metropolitan areas beginning 
in 2010.12  The House of Representatives passed a 
proposal to repeal this authority in the 2007 as part 
of the CHAMP Act to extend the SCHIP program, 
but the repeal provision was not included in the 
final version of the enacted legislation.
PAYMENT TO MA PLANS BASED ON PLAN BIDS  
The goal of a MA plan bid-based payment system 
would be to reduce payments to MA plans from the 
current average of 113 percent of fee-for-service 
and “pay them the same amount it would cost to 
treat the same patients under regular Medicare.”13  
This reduction in future Federal spending, estimat-
ed by CBO at $150 billion over 10 years, has been 
proposed to be used in the development of health 
care reform legislation to off-set the budget costs 
of expanding health insurance coverage to the 47 
million uninsured or for other initiatives including 
improvements to Medicare.  
 This analysis examines the impact of a bid-
based MA plan payment system relative to the 
payments of all plans in the nation at 100 percent 
of fee-for-service in the county by comparing cur-
rent MA bid levels with the 100 percent of fee-for-
service costs.  
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Figure 1. Medicare Advantage Plan Bids and Payments vs.
100% Local Fee-for-Service Costs, 2009
Sources: GWU analysis of Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Medicare Advantage enrollment and payment data for February 2009, and Medicare Payment 
Advisory Commission analysis of MA plan bids for 2009.
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Overview of the effect a plan bid-based payment 
system.  Paying MA plans at the enrollee weighted 
average of plan bids in each county in the nation 
would produce Federal savings of more than $158 
billion over the next 10 years according to CBO.14  
This CBO estimate of savings is very close to the 
$157 billion savings estimated for setting payments 
MA plans at 100 percent of fee-for-service costs in 
each county.15 
 The bid-based approach would not, however, 
actually pay MA plans with the substantial major-
ity of enrollees the same as 100 percent of fee-for-
service costs in their individual county.  While 
the national average of a plan bid-based payment 
system would be close to 100 percent of fee-for-
service nationwide, this approach would create a 
wide variation in payments to plans relative to fee-
for-service in individual counties. 16 
 As Figure 1 illustrates, the bid-based payment 
approach would continue the current pattern 
of plans in many counties now being paid more 
than others.  The major change would be that the 
national average MA plan payment would decrease 
from the 113 percent of average local fee-for-ser-
vice costs to roughly 101 percent of costs.   
 The major change in the pattern for a bid-
based system would be that the national average 
would decrease from 113 percent of average fee-for 
service costs to roughly 101 percent of average fee-
for-service costs. 
 The way that a bid-based MA payment ap-
proach eliminates the national average of 13 per-
cent extra payments to MA plans and saves $150 
billion over ten years is by balancing the continua-
tion of extra payments of more than 100 percent of 
FFS costs to plans in some counties with equivalent 
amounts of payments at less than 100 percent of 
FFS in other counties.   
Sources:  
GW analysis of Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Medicare Advantage enroll-
ment and payment data for February 2009, and Medicare Payment Advisory Commission 
analysis of MA plan bids for 2009.
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 Under the bid-based approach, plans in coun-
ties that would be paid less than 100 percent of 
local FFS costs would be paid an estimated $3.2 
billion less than FFS costs while plans that would 
be paid more than 100 percent of local FFS costs 
would be paid an estimated $3.7 billion more than 
FFS costs.  
Overall impact of a bid-based MA plan payment 
system.    The overall impact of a MA bid-based 
payment system on payments to plans at the 
county level are analyzed here using eight cohorts 
of counties with each individual county assigned 
to a cohort by the amount of fee-for-service costs 
in the county.  (Figure 2)   
 This analysis indicates that MA plans in coun-
ties with higher than the national average of FFS 
costs of $8,740 per year would generally be paid 
appreciably less than 100 percent of FFS costs in 
the county.  MA plans in counties with lower than 
the national average of FFS costs would be con-
tinue to receive extra payments significantly more 
than 100 percent of FFS costs in the county.   
 Overall, MA plans in the approximately 70 
counties in Cohort 1 with the highest FFS costs 
in the nation – over $10,500 per year (with aver-
Figure 2. Medicare Advantage Plan Bids vs.
100% Local Fee-for-Service Costs by MedPAC Cohorts, 20091
FFS to Bids, Annual Plan Gain/Loss 
MedPAC 
Cohort2
Medicare 
Beneficiaries
MA Plan 
Enrollees3
Average
Annual 
FFS Costs 
per 
Enrollee4
Average
Annual 
MA Plan 
Bid per 
Enrollee5
Average
Percentage
Average
Per 
Enrollee
Total 
(millions)
National 44,575,208 10,014,280 $8,740 $8,800 1% $59 $593
1 2,871,645 1,007,159 $11,438 $9,608 -16% -$1,830 -$1,843
2 8,030,865 1,630,261 $9,788 $9,299 -5% -$489 -$798
3 8,280,382 1,975,720 $8,969 $8,699 -3% -$269 -$532
4 10,365,711 2,107,705 $8,397 $8,649 3% $252 $531
5 8,490,620 1,772,708 $7,826 $8,608 10% $783 $1,387
6 5,046,265 1,164,380 $7,205 $8,357 16% $1,153 $1,342
7 1,377,200 331,355 $6,689 $8,094 21% $1,405 $465
8 112,520 24,992 $6,188 $7,797 26% $1,609 $40
 
Sources:
The George Washington University analysis of Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Medicare Managed 
Care State/County/Contract Data File, released February 2009; Medicare Managed Care State/County 
Penetration Data File, released February 2009; and the Medicare Advantage 2009 Rate Calculation Data 
Spreadsheet.  Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) analysis of MA plan bids for 2009.
Notes:
1.   Calculations at the county level, weighted by MA enrollment
2.   Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) MIPPA Medicare Advantage Payment Report, March 
12, 2009.  Available at http://www.medpac.gov/meetings.cfm
3.   Exclude MA plan enrollees in Cost plans, Puerto Rico, Guam, Virgin Islands and American Samoa
4.   Include a reduction for Indirect Medical Education costs
5.   Calculated in relation to fee-for-service costs using MedPAC analysis of 2009 county bids
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age costs of $11,438) – would be paid over $1.8 
billion a year less than 100 percent of FFS costs 
in their counties. The average payment to plans 
in these counties would be at 84 percent of FFS 
costs or $1,800 less per enrollee than FFS costs in 
the county.  The counties have over 1 million MA 
enrollees.   
 In contrast, MA plans in the approximately 
770 counties in the three Cohorts 6, 7 and 8 with 
the lowest FFS costs in the nation – under $7,500 
per year (with average costs of $7,205 or less) 
would be paid over $1.8 billion dollars a year more 
than average FFS costs in their counties.  The 
average payment to plans in these counties would 
be over 116 percent of FFS costs and $1,150 more 
per enrollee than average FFS costs in the county.  
These counties have over 1.5 million MA enrollees. 
 Overall, a bid-based MA payment system 
would achieve a national average of payments to 
MA plans of 101 percent of FFS costs by balancing 
savings from new under payments to plans in some 
counties with the costs of continued  extra pay-
ments to plans other counties.  In general terms, 
plans in the counties that would lose the most 
would be paid an average of 16 percent less than 
local FFS costs while plans in the counties that 
would gain the most would be paid an average of 
16 percent or more than local FFS costs.
Effect of a plan bid-based payment system on 
payments in states.  At the state level, the bid-
based payment system would shift billions of dol-
lars among states compared with payment at 100 
percent of FFS costs by county.  (Appendix I) 
 The states with largest total losses compared to 
100 percent of FFS costs would be, consistent with 
the analysis just discussed, those states with coun-
ties with high costs in FFS Medicare.   
 Overall, the most notable impact would be 
on Florida which would lose $2,160 per enrollee 
relative to FFS costs and nearly $2.0 billion a year.  
Plans in Florida would be paid at an average of 79 
percent of FFS costs in the county.  California, with 
nearly 1.6 million enrollees, would be paid a total 
of $320 million less than FFS costs, and Nevada 
would be paid at $1,270 less than FFS costs and a 
total of $131 million a year.  Other notable losses 
include Louisiana at almost $100 million a year less 
than FFS costs and Alabama and Texas at about 
$50 million a year less. 
 As a percent of payments, the states with the 
lowest average payments in a bid-based system 
compared to 100 percent of FFS costs would be 
Florida at 79 percent, Nevada at 87 percent and 
Louisiana at 93 percent.   
 The states that would gain the most with a bid-
based payment system compared to 100 percent 
FFS costs would be Pennsylvania with $650 million 
a year, Oregon with $320 million and Washington 
with $290 million.  The states that would have 
payments the most in excess of 100 percent of FFS 
costs would be Hawaii at 27 percent, Oregon and 
Washington State at 18 percent and Virginia at 16 
percent.
CONCLUSION  
In recent years, there has been extensive discussion 
about eliminating extra payments to MA plans.  
In 2008, the Obama campaign indicated that MA 
plans should be paid “...the same amount it costs 
to treat the same patient under regular Medi-
care.”  This position was consistent with a proposal 
passed by the House of Representatives in 2007, 
but not enacted, that would have, after a four year 
transition, paid MA plans at 100 percent of the 
average FFS costs in each county in the nation.    
 The $150 billion in funds to be saved from 
Medicare by paying MA plans the same as FFS 
costs would be used in health care reform legisla-
tion to help offset the new Federal costs of expand-
ing coverage to the uninsured and for Medicare 
improvements and other initiatives.     
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 Early in 2009, Obama administration Office of 
Management and Budget proposed that Medicare 
private plans, rather than being paid 100 percent of 
costs in regular FFS Medicare should instead in the 
future be paid based on “competitive payments.”  
Under this approach, payments to MA plans would 
be based on the amount of the bids that the plans 
submit each year to Medicare.  Medicare MA plans 
have been submitting bids to Medicare since 2006 
and, before that, similar calculations that were 
termed the “adjusted community rate” or ACR. 
 This approach would, for the first time, since 
President Reagan proposed risk based capitation 
payments to Health Maintenance Organizations in 
1982, shift the payment of Medicare private plans 
from an approach based on FFS costs in the local 
county to one based on the private plans’ own 
internal costs.   
 Analysis of MA plans’ enrollment and bids in 
2009 indicates two key features of the impact of 
such an approach to payment of to MA private 
plans.   
 First, a bid-based payment approach would 
allow private health insurance firms in some 
generally low-cost counties, by submitting bids 
that average more than the costs of FFS Medicare 
in an area, to continue to be paid more – in some 
cases much more – than “the same amount it cost 
to treat the same patient under regular Medicare” 
in the counties where they operate.  MA plan bids 
in 2009 indicate that this approach would continue 
extra payments – payments in excess of FFS costs – 
to plans in counties with 54 percent of MA enroll-
ees.   
 Of these plans, those in the lowest cost coun-
ties with 15 percent of total MA enrollees would 
continue to be paid an average of 17 percent and 
$1,200 per enrollee per year more than FFS costs.  
Extra payments to MA plans in these counties 
would total over $1.8 billion a year. 
 Second, plans in other generally high-cost 
counties would be paid less—in some cases much 
less—than FFS costs in the same county.  This 
would be the first time in the history of Medicare 
that risk plans would be paid less than 95 percent 
of FFS costs in their county. 
 Under payments – payments less than FFS 
costs – to plans in the highest FFS cost counties, 
with 10 percent of total MA enrollees, would be 
paid an average of 16 percent or $1,800 per year 
below FFS costs in the same county. Under pay-
ments in those counties would total $1.8 billion a 
year.   
 The real impact of the loss from plan pay-
ments below FFS costs would not be on the MA 
plans themselves – their costs and profits are 
included in the bids - but on the MA plan enrollees 
in these areas whose extra benefits are dependent 
on amounts that plan bids are less than Medicare 
payments. 
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Appendix I. 
Medicare Advantage Plan Bids vs. 100% Local Fee-for-Service Costs by State, 20091
FFS to Bids, Annual Plan Gain/Loss
State
Medicare 
Beneficiaries
MA Plan 
Enrollees2
Annual FFS 
Costs per 
Enrollee3
Annual 
MA Plan 
Bid per 
Enrollee4
Percentage
Per 
Enrollee
Total 
(millions)
National 44,575,208 10,014,280 $8,740 $8,854 1.3% $113 $1,136
Alabama 813,023 170,929 $8,579 $8,277 -3.5% -$302 -$52
Alaska 60,873 640 $8,859 $9,985 12.7% $1,126 $1
Arizona 867,756 323,823 $8,490 $8,583 1.1% $93 $30
Arkansas 511,579 67,808 $7,894 $8,447 7.0% $553 $38
California 4,525,318 1,570,931 $9,246 $9,041 -2.2% -$206 -$323
Colorado 585,428 173,014 $8,470 $8,717 2.9% $247 $43
Connecticut 550,451 87,916 $8,991 $9,116 1.4% $125 $11
D.C. 75,319 3,244 $9,144 $9,743 6.5% $599 $2
Delaware 141,605 6,627 $8,364 $8,725 4.3% $361 $2
Florida 3,212,467 922,369 $10,331 $8,172 -20.9% -$2,158 -$1,991
Georgia 1,165,463 169,945 $8,154 $8,692 6.6% $538 $91
Hawaii 195,957 37,902 $6,673 $8,473 27.0% $1,800 $68
Idaho 216,060 57,219 $7,511 $8,252 9.9% $740 $42
Illinois 1,781,296 168,079 $8,750 $8,800 0.6% $49 $8
Indiana 967,014 132,303 $7,850 $8,711 11.0% $861 $114
Iowa 506,375 56,193 $7,156 $8,241 15.2% $1,085 $61
Kansas 419,188 40,914 $8,170 $8,619 5.5% $449 $18
Kentucky 730,912 103,977 $8,155 $8,854 8.6% $699 $73
Louisiana 660,112 146,528 $9,934 $9,254 -6.8% -$680 -$100
Maine 254,799 23,921 $7,312 $8,488 16.1% $1,176 $28
Maryland 748,874 36,215 $9,919 $9,575 -3.5% -$344 -$12
Massachusetts 1,022,639 195,785 $8,907 $9,495 6.6% $588 $115
Michigan 1,586,025 380,956 $8,563 $9,019 5.3% $455 $173
Minnesota 753,622 175,517 $8,377 $8,694 3.8% $317 $56
Mississippi 480,440 43,827 $8,922 $8,950 0.3% $28 $1
Missouri 969,943 190,434 $8,069 $8,413 4.3% $344 $66
Montana 161,564 27,046 $7,410 $8,216 10.9% $806 $22
Nebraska 272,073 29,612 $7,966 $8,712 9.4% $746 $22
Nevada 333,012 102,927 $9,743 $8,475 -13.0% -$1,268 -$131
New Hampshire 206,279 12,229 $8,002 $8,910 11.4% $908 $11
New Jersey 1,286,842 152,989 $9,298 $9,729 4.6% $431 $66
New Mexico 296,720 71,462 $6,962 $7,988 14.7% $1,025 $73
New York 2,893,663 822,535 $8,978 $9,168 2.1% $190 $156
North Carolina 1,412,465 244,055 $7,800 $8,581 10.0% $780 $190
North Dakota 106,489 6,984 $7,231 $8,211 13.6% $980 $7
Ohio 1,842,490 471,989 $8,159 $8,754 7.3% $595 $281
Oklahoma 581,736 83,262 $9,128 $8,875 -2.8% -$253 -$21
Oregon 588,151 244,823 $7,444 $8,764 17.7% $1,319 $323
Pennsylvania 2,222,492 842,648 $8,500 $9,270 9.1% $770 $649
Rhode Island 178,068 64,713 $7,823 $8,897 13.7% $1,074 $69
South Carolina 727,451 105,515 $8,001 $8,645 8.0% $643 $68
South Dakota 132,581 9,424 $7,238 $8,211 13.4% $972 $9
Tennessee 1,007,924 221,207 $8,254 $8,392 1.7% $138 $31
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Texas 2,826,361 488,491 $9,612 $9,515 -1.0% -$97 -$47
Utah 266,648 79,422 $7,908 $8,445 6.8% $537 $43
Vermont 105,682 3,800 $7,290 $8,314 14.0% $1,024 $4
Virginia 1,085,920 132,793 $7,350 $8,549 16.3% $1,200 $159
Washington 910,436 215,825 $7,622 $8,982 17.8% $1,360 $293
West Virginia 373,403 73,546 $7,798 $8,672 11.2% $875 $64
Wisconsin 877,674 216,329 $7,440 $8,486 14.1% $1,046 $226
Wyoming 76,546 3,638 $7,995 $8,728 9.2% $734 $3
Sources:
The George Washington University analysis of Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Medicare Managed 
Care State/County/Contract Data File, released February 2009; Medicare Managed Care State/County 
Penetration Data File, released February 2009; and the Medicare Advantage 2009 Rate Calculation Data 
Spreadsheet.  Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) analysis of MA plan rebates by state for 2009.
Notes:
1. Calculations at the state level, weighted by MA enrollment
2. Excludes MA plan enrollees in Cost plans, Puerto Rico, Guam, Virgin Islands and American Samoa
3. Includes a reduction for Indirect Medical Education costs
4. Bids are calculated by subtracting four-thirds the value of the state-wide rebate from enrollee-weighted 
state-wide average MA benchmarks for 2009.
FFS to Bids, Annual Plan Gain/Loss
State
Medicare 
Beneficiaries
MA Plan 
Enrollees2
Annual FFS 
Costs per 
Enrollee3
Annual 
MA Plan 
Bid per 
Enrollee4
Percentage
Per 
Enrollee
Total 
(millions)
Study Methods
This report’s 2009 analysis is based on data on the level of Medicare Advantage (MA) plan bids and 
rebates provided by the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) for 2009, and MA plan 
benchmarks and fee-for-service (FFS) expenditure averages posted by county in the 2009 CMS Medi-
care Advantage Rate Calculation Data spreadsheet.1  The number of Medicare beneficiaries and Medi-
care Advantage enrollees by county is taken from the CMS State/County Penetration data file and the 
CMS State/County/Contract data file for February 2009. These data are posted on the website of the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, http://www.cms.hhs.gov.2 
 Over 300,000 MA enrollees are in Medicare “cost” plans, paid on the basis of costs. Although these 
beneficiaries (identified through the CMS Medicare Advantage State/County/Contract data file for Feb-
ruary 2009) receive Medicare benefits through managed care plans, they do not generate extra payments 
based on MA plan payment rates.3  Cost beneficiaries were removed from the Medicare Advantage 
enrollee totals by county but are included in the number of overall Medicare beneficiaries.  Puerto Rico, 
Guam, American Samoa and the Virgin Islands are not included in the analysis. All calculations are MA 
plan enrollee-weighted to reflect variations in enrollment and payment rates. 
 For analysis at the national level, MedPAC grouped all counties into one of eight cohorts, deter-
mined by their respective 2009 annual FFS costs, and provided aggregated bid-to-FFS ratios for each 
cohort.  This information was originally reported on March 12, 2009 in the MIPPA Medicare Advantage 
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Payment Report.  Briefs, presentations and transcripts are available at http://www.medpac.gov/meet-
ings.cfm.  The authors used these average bid-to-FFS ratios to derive an annual bid value for each 
county.  Using the MA plan enrollment for each county used by MedPAC for the original calculations, 
the authors re-aggregated the counties into their respective cohorts to determine overall gains and 
losses. 
 MedPAC also provided state average plan rebates, weighted by plan enrollment.  In this analysis, 
the authors calculated the enrollee-weighted state-wide average MA plan benchmarks, including a 
budget-neutral risk adjustment of 0.9 percent, and then lessed four thirds the value of the rebate from 
the benchmark to obtain the state-wide average plan bids.  This convention follows from the bidding 
mechanism established by the MMA, in which each MA plan submits a bid equal to the payment it 
would require for providing traditional Medicare benefits to its enrollees. The bid submitted by each 
plan is compared with the benchmark rate in each county it serves, and each plan receives from Medi-
care a payment rate equal to the benchmark rate (if its bid is equal to or greater than the benchmark 
rate) or (if its bid is less than the benchmark rate) its bid plus a ‘rebate’ of 75 percent of the difference 
between the benchmark rate and the bid.
Notes:
1. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Rate Calculation Data Risk 2009 spreadsheet (Baltimore, 
Md.: CMS, Apr. 2008), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/
2. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Monthly Medicare Advantage State/County/Contract 
Data and Monthly Medicare Advantage State/County Penetration Data (Baltimore, Md.: CMS, Feb. 
2009), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MCRAdvPartDEnrolData/
3. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Monthly Medicare Advantage State/County/
Contract Data (Baltimore, Md.: CMS, Feb. 2009), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/
MCRAdvPartDEnrolData/
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